Frankenpeople
Playground of the Children of Frankenstein
23 February 2015
Reflection on Burke or on Rousseau - Please post your response as a comment here by 9 am Tuesday, February 24 for class discussion that day.
Both Edmund Burke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau undoubtedly influenced Mary Shelley. Rousseau profoundly influenced the political thought of her father, William Godwin, as well as the educational theories of her mother Mary Wollstonecraft. She read Rousseau during the year before she conceived of Frankenstein.
Burke must have been a more general influence. He was a prominent opponent of both Godwin and Wollstonecraft. But he articulated important ideas about the Sublime, which was the subject matter of Mary Shelley's circle, and especially of her husband, Percy Bysshe Shelley.
Now that you have read some of both these thinkers, please respond in a paragraph or so to this topic:
How do Burke OR Rousseau's ideas about Humanity and Nature emerge in Frankenstein?
Does an awareness of the thought of EITHER Burke or Rousseau alert us to things in the book we might not otherwise notice, or help us to understand the book better?
As I'm trying to indicate, you're requested to address only one of these authors.
03 February 2015
The Romantic Sublime in Art
Henry Fuseli, The Nightmare, 1781.
Fuseli was a lover of Mary Wollstonecraft's before she met William Godwin,
Mary Shelly's father. He was also married. Wollstonecraft proposed a ménage à trois,
which Fuseli rejected, and dropped her.
Joseph Wright of Derby, An Experiment on a Bird in an Air-Pump, 1768.
Not an instance of the Sublime, the painting does indicate how experimentation might be undertaken in private homes, to educate members of the household. Wright is interested in depicting a moment of drama: Will the vacuum be released, allowing in oxygen to revive the asphyxiated bird (in the glass bell at top)? The drama is shown in the varied responses of the subjects--including the lovers at the left, who take no notice of the scene.
Caspar David Friedrich, The Wanderer Above the Mists, 1818
This definitely Romantic solitary figure, contemplating the magnificence of Nature, is a contemporary and maybe a kindred spirit of Victor Frankenstein.
Frederic Church, Niagara Falls, 1857.
One of the most celebrated works in the Corcoran Gallery collection of American art.
Gilbert Moran, The Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone, 1875
European expansion into North America may have influenced the increasing interest in the Sublime. To 19th-century Europeans, America meant vast expanses of breath-taking natural wonders; Americans themselves identified expansionism and "Manifest Destiny" with a growing interest in preserving (as well as exploiting) these apparently limitless wonders.
Karl Bodmer, Niagara Falls, 1830s
Horace Vernet, Stormy Coast After a Shipwreck, 1820s
JMW Turner, The Wreck of a Transport Ship, 1810
John Martin, The Great Day of His Wrath, 1853
Francisco Goya, Saturn Devouring His Son, 1820s
Greenland fjord by Bob Ford for Reuters, 1009
The Technological Sublime: Human-Made Power
From James Whale, Frankenstein, 1931
In the twentieth century, it appeared that Sublime themes could be impressively represented in motion pictures--not only in genres that evoke a "delightful" feeling of apprehension or terror, but also in contemplation of the vastness of Nature, as in Westerns or Science Fiction.
The representation of the power of electricity or of nuclear fission suggests what has been called a "technological Sublime," which appears when we are overwhelmed by the power of human-made machinery, or even theories about the cosmos.
02 February 2015
Edmund Burke - from A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of The Sublime and Beautiful (1757)
Edmund Burke (1729-1797)
At the age of nineteen, the
Irish writer Edmund Burke wrote a treatise on the sublime which established the
concept as a central one in modern aesthetics. Building on the English
tradition of the 18th century, he turned the consideration of the
sublime from the context of rhetoric, as classical texts did, to a general
theory of art and feeling--“sensibility,” as his age came to call it--and
inspired other philosophers, such as Kant and Hegel, to see the opposition of
the sublime and the beautiful as a way of constructing a rational analysis of
aesthetic response built on scientific knowledge and the emerging field of
psychology.
An important member of parliament and
political orator, Burke is also known as the father of modern
conservatism--although aside from his defense of stable authority in Reflections on the Revolution in France,
his political views were generally classically liberal.
The passions which belong to
self-preservation turn on pain and danger; they are simply painful when their
causes immediately affect us; they are delightful when we have an idea of pain
and danger, without being actually in such circumstances; this delight I have
not called pleasure, because it turns on pain, and because it is different
enough from any idea of positive pleasure. Whatever excites this delight, I
call sublime. The passions belonging
to self-preservation are the strongest of all the passions.
The second head to which the passions are
referred with relation to their final cause, is society. There are two sorts of
societies. The first is, the society of sex. The passion belonging to this is
called love, and it contains a mixture of lust; its object is the beauty of
women. The other is the great society with man and all other animals. The
passion subservient to this is called likewise love, but it has no mixture of
lust, and its object is beauty; which is a name I shall apply to all such
qualities in things as induce in us a sense of affection and tenderness, or
some other passion the most nearly resembling these. The passion of love has
its rise in positive pleasure; it is, like all things which grow out of
pleasure, capable of being mixed with a mode of uneasiness, that is, when an
idea of its object is excited in the mind with an idea at the same time of
having irretrievably lost it. This mixed sense of pleasure I have not called pain, because it turns upon actual
pleasure, and because it is, both in its cause and in most of its effects, of a
nature altogether different.
Next to the general passion we have for
society, to a choice in which we are directed by the pleasure we have in the
object, the particular passion under this head called sympathy has the greatest
extent. The nature of this passion is, to put us in the place of another in
whatever circumstance he is in, and to affect us in a like manner; so that this
passion may, as the occasion requires, turn either on pain or pleasure
Of the Sublime
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the
ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or
is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to
terror, is a source of the sublime;
that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of
feeling. I say the strongest emotion, because I am satisfied the ideas of pain
are much more powerful than those which enter on the part of pleasure. Without
all doubt, the torments which we may be made to suffer are much greater in
their effect on the body and mind, than any pleasure which the most learned
voluptuary could suggest, or than the liveliest imagination, and the most sound
and exquisitely sensible body, could enjoy. . . . But as pain is stronger in
its operation than pleasure, so death is in general a much more affecting idea
than pain; because there are very few pains, however exquisite, which are not
preferred to death: nay, what generally makes pain itself, if I may say so,
more painful, is, that it is considered as an emissary of this king of terrors.
When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight,
and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications,
they may be, and they are, delightful, as we every day experience. . . .
Astonishment, as I have said, is the effect of the sublime in its highest
degree; the inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect.
Terror
No passion so effectually robs the mind of
all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear.
For fear being an apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a manner that
resembles actual pain. Whatever therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is
sublime too, whether this cause of terror be endued with greatness of
dimensions or not; for it is impossible to look on anything as trifling, or
contemptible, that may be dangerous. There are many animals, who though far
from being large, are yet capable of raising ideas of the sublime, because they
are considered as objects of terror. As serpents and poisonous animals of
almost all kinds. . . . Indeed, terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more
openly or latently, the ruling principle of the sublime.
Obscurity
To
make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary.
When we know the full extent of any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to
it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes. Every one will be sensible of
this, who considers how greatly night adds to our dread, in all cases of
danger, and how much the notions of ghosts and goblins, of which none can form
clear ideas, affect minds which give credit to the popular tales concerning
such sorts of beings. Those despotic governments, which are founded on the
passions of men, and principally upon the passion of fear, keep their chief as
much as may be from the public eye. The policy has been the same in many cases
of religion. Almost all the heathen temples were dark. Even in the barbarous
temples of the Americans at this day, they keep their idol in a dark part of
the hut, which is consecrated to his worship. For this purpose too the Druids
performed all their ceremonies in the bosom of the darkest woods, and in the
shade of the oldest and most spreading oaks.
Power
Besides those things which directly
suggest the idea of danger, and those which produce a similar effect from a
mechanical cause, I know of nothing sublime, which is not some modification of
power. And this branch rises, as naturally as the other two branches, from
terror, the common stock of everything that is sublime. . . . where the chances
for equal degrees of suffering or enjoyment are in any sort equal, the idea of
the suffering must always be prevalent. And indeed the ideas of pain, and,
above all, of death, are so very affecting, that whilst we remain in the
presence of whatever is supposed to have the power of inflicting either, it is
impossible to be perfectly free from terror. . . . Pleasure follows the will;
and therefore we are generally affected with it by many things of a force
greatly inferior to our own. But pain is always inflicted by a power in some
way superior, because we never submit to pain willingly. So that strength,
violence, pain, and terror, are ideas that rush in upon the mind together. . .
.
. . . The power which arises from institution
in kings and commanders, has the same connexion with terror. Sovereigns are
frequently addressed with the title of dread
majesty. . . I know some people are of opinion, that no awe, no degree of
terror, accompanies the idea of power; and have hazarded to affirm, that we can
contemplate the idea of God himself without any such emotion. I purposely
avoided, when I first considered this subject, to introduce the idea of that
great and tremendous Being, as an example in an argument so light as this;
though it frequently occurred to me, not as an objection to, but as a strong
confirmation of, my notions in this matter. I hope, in what I am going to say,
I shall avoid presumption, where it is almost impossible for any mortal to
speak with strict propriety. I say then that whilst we consider the Godhead
merely as he is an object of the understanding, which forms a complex idea of
power, wisdom, justice, goodness, all stretched to a degree far exceeding the
bounds of our comprehension, whilst we consider the Divinity in this refined
and abstracted light, the imagination and passions are little or nothing
affected. But because we are bound, by the condition of our nature, to ascend
to these pure and intellectual ideas, through the medium of sensible images,
and to judge of these divine qualities by their evident acts and exertions, it
becomes extremely hard to disentangle our idea of the cause from the effect by
which we are led to know it. Thus when we contemplate the Deity, his attributes
and their operation, coming united on the mind, form a sort of sensible image,
and as such are capable of affecting the imagination. Now, though in a just
idea of the Deity perhaps none of his attributes are predominant, yet, to our
imagination, his power is by far the most striking. Some reflection, some
comparing, is necessary to satisfy us of his wisdom, his justice, and his
goodness. To be struck with his power, it is only necessary that we should open
our eyes. But whilst we contemplate so vast an object, under the arm, as it
were, of almighty power, and invested upon every side with omnipresence, we
shrink into the minuteness of our own nature, and are, in a manner, annihilated
before him. And though a consideration of his other attributes may relieve, in
some measure, our apprehensions; yet no conviction of the justice with which it
is exercised, nor the mercy with which it is tempered, can wholly remove the
terror that naturally arises from a force which nothing can withstand. If we
rejoice, we rejoice with trembling: and even whilst we are receiving benefits,
we cannot but shudder at a power which can confer benefits of such mighty
importance. . . . In the Scripture, wherever God is represented as appearing or
speaking, everything terrible in nature is called up to heighten the awe and
solemnity of the Divine presence.
Some dimensions of the sublime:
All general
privations are great, because they are all terrible; Vacuity, Darkness, Solitude,
and Silence.
Greatness of dimension [Vastness]
is a powerful cause of the sublime. This is too evident, and the observation
too common, to need any illustration
Infinity has a tendency to fill the mind with that
sort of delightful horror, which is the most genuine effect and truest test of
the sublime. There are scarce any things which can become the objects of our
senses, that are really and in their own nature infinite. But the eye not being
able to perceive the bounds of many things, they seem to be infinite, and they
produce the same effects as if they were really so. We are deceived in the like
manner, if the parts of some large object are so continued to any indefinite
number, that the imagination meets no check which may hinder its extending them
at pleasure.
Magnificence is likewise a source of the sublime. A great
profusion of things, which are splendid or valuable in themselves, is magnificent. The starry heaven, though
it occurs so very frequently to our view, never fails to excite an idea of grandeur.
This cannot be owing to the stars themselves, separately considered. The number
is certainly the cause. The apparent disorder augments the grandeur, for the
appearance of care is highly contrary to our idea of magnificence. Besides, the
stars lie in such apparent confusion, as makes it impossible on ordinary
occasions to reckon them. This gives them the advantage of a sort of infinity.
In works of art, this kind of grandeur, which consists in multitude, is to be
very courteously admitted; because a profusion of excellent things is not to be
attained, or with too much difficulty; and because in many cases this splendid
confusion would destroy all use, which should be attended to in most of the
works of art with the greatest care; besides, it is to be considered, that
unless you can produce an appearance of infinity by your disorder, you will
have disorder only without magnificence. There are, however, a sort of
fireworks, and some other things, that in this way succeed well, and are truly
grand.
Excessive loudness alone is
sufficient to overpower the soul, to suspend its action, and to fill it with
terror. The noise of vast cataracts, raging storms, thunder, or artillery,
awakes a great and awful sensation in the mind, though we can observe no nicety
or artifice in those sorts of music. The shouting of multitudes has a similar
effect; and, by the sole strength of the sound, so amazes and confounds the
imagination, that, in this staggering and hurry of the mind, the
best-established tempers can scarcely forbear being borne down, and joining in
the common cry, and common resolution of the crowd.
27 January 2015
Critical Questions on Frankenstein - Please respond with a comment to this post by 9 am Tuesday, February 3
To get started on synthesizing your own thoughts on Frankenstein, and to prepare for discussion at our next two sessions, please select ONE of the questions below and in a paragraph, suggest how you would develop your response.
This does NOT require providing an answer to the question. Instead, consider what you find in the text that could indicate a direction, and what KIND of answer you find satisfying. Considering the questions within parentheses should help. For example, an answer that addresses what you know about Frankenstein's psychological character would be very different from one that sees the book as a philosophical statement. You might try free writing -- write about the question without pausing to remove pen from paper (or fingers from keys); don't allow yourself to stop, but transcribe what's going through your head until you feel you've run out of steam.
This exercise is intended to prompt thinking about what you see as the ground of interpretation--what kind of response to a critical question seems to you like a relevant and satisfactory response?
You do NOT need to select the question you'll write on for February 10 now.
1) Why does Victor Frankenstein create his creature? (What do we learn from his own account—including things he does as well as says? What can we infer from what Walton, his teachers, his family and others say of him, and from what he reveals about himself? Do you understand his ambition more as a desire to extend knowledge, or as an unfulfilled personal need?)
2) Is the creature Frankenstein creates a human being? (What view do you think the author takes? Are there any characteristics or qualities definitive of humanity—according to the book’s view or your own? Is it important to consider how he differs from human beings? What does the Creature himself seem to think?)
3) Why does Frankenstein’s creature want a mate? Why does Frankenstein decide not to provide one? (What is the role of sex and reproduction in the story? Are Frankenstein’s motivations clear and reasonable or obscure and suspect? What would happen if Frankenstein followed through? What wouldn’t happen?)
4) What is the source of the enmity between Frankenstein and his creation? (Why does Frankenstein abandon the creature? How does the creature respond? What lesson or principle does each of them infer from this? Is the book offering an allegory or lesson in this central conflict?)
13 January 2015
La Jetée: Critical Analysis and Formulating a Thesis - Post by 9 am Jan 20
GWU 47448 CAS 2010.11 Humanities
II - Children of Frankenstein - SP
2015
1) Prepare a one-paragraph statement that answers this question:
How does La Jetée convey a message about the impact of technology on humanity?
When you’ve
completed the paragraph:
2) Summarize its point in a one-sentence thesis
answering the question.
4) Read other people’s theses and be prepared to discuss
them in class on Jan 21.
It will help to
consider:
What is the story
really about?
How does the plot
present the story?
What role do
science and technology play in the plot?
What makes this
film unusual?
What do these unusual
formal and stylistic features contribute?
Please do not
consult any resources--criticism, reviews, fan pages, etc.--available online or
in print before you write. Rely on your own analysis and ideas.
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